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The psychology of indicative
conditionals and conditional bets
Abstract. There is a new Bayesian, or probabilistic, paradigm in the psychology of rea-1
soning, with new psychological accounts of the indicative conditional of natural language.2
In psychological experiments in this new paradigm, people judge that the probability of3
the indicative conditional, P (if A then C ), is the conditional probability of C given A,4
P (C | A). In other experiments, participants respond with what has been called the ‘de-5
fective’ truth table: they judge that if A then C is true when A holds and C holds, is false6
when A holds and C does not, and is neither true nor false when A does not hold. We7
argue that these responses are not ‘defective’ in any negative sense, as many psychologists8
have implied. We point out that a number of normative researchers, including de Finetti,9
have proposed such a table for various coherent interpretations of the third value. We10
review the relevant general tables in the normative literature, in which there is a third11
value for A and C and the logically compound forms of the natural language conditional,12
negation, conjunction, disjunction, and the material conditional. We describe the results13
of an experiment on which of these tables best describes ordinary people’s judgements14
when the third value is interpreted as indicating uncertainty.15
Keywords: Bayesian account of reasoning; probability conditional; uncertainty and three-16
valued tables; de Finetti tables17
Introduction and overview18
Researchers working in the field of the psychology of reasoning have generally19
selected some theoretical model to establish a referential norm of ‘rational20
inference’. Many psychological studies consist of comparing participants’ re-21
sponses to the results prescribed by such a normative model. Psychologists22
have traditionally assumed that there are different psychological processes23
corresponding to the subject divisions of the field: judgement and decision-24
making, probability judgement / inductive reasoning, and deductive reason-25
ing. The three major normative models used are (i) the Subjective Expected26
Utility Theory in decision theory studies, (ii) the Bayesian model in the27
context of probability judgement and induction (iii) extensional bivalent28
Propositional Logic for deductive reasoning. However the choice of a spe-29
cific normative model for a given field has deep epistemological implications30
(for probability judgement see [2, 5, 6]). More drastically, theorists have31
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increasingly objected to the very segmentation of inferences in the tradi-32
tional approach. Indeed, there is a new Bayesian paradigm that seeks to33
integrate the psychology of reasoning. It holds that people, in everyday and34
scientific contexts, tend to reason under uncertainty even when carrying out35
a deductive task. In this new paradigm, rationality is defined in terms of36
Bayesian probability theory rather than with reference to extensional logic37
([54, 55, 58]). But a great deal of psychological research will be necessary38
to identify the logic system(s) underlying everyday reasoning in natural lan-39
guage and to determine its compatibility with Bayesian theory. The present40
paper aims to sketch a method to identify the kind of logic that underlies41
lay peoples’ reasoning; it adopts the standpoint of the new paradigm and42
introduces uncertainty as a third value1 in addition to truth and falsity.43
44
Two experimental findings have given considerable impetus to the new Baye-45
sian paradigm in the psychology of reasoning and its aim of explaining rea-46
soning under uncertainty ([3, 33, 54, 55, 58, 60]).47
48
The first finding is the confirmation of the conditional probability hypoth-49
esis that people judge the probability of the natural language indicative50
conditional, if A then C, to be the conditional probability of C given A,51
P (C | A) and not the probability of the material conditional (P (A ⊃ C))52
equivalent to not-(A & not-C), as commonly assumed in the old paradigm.53
This relationship, P (if A then C ) = P (C | A), has such far reaching impli-54
cations that it is sometimes called the Equation in both philosophy ([31])55
and psychology ([54, 55]). It has been strongly supported in a wide range of56
experiments ([27, 34, 35, 39, 56, 59, 61]).57
58
The second finding is what has long been called the defective truth table59
in psychology (see [36]). Participants are given truth table tasks and asked60
to make a judgement about a natural language indicative conditional, if A61
then C, when given rows of the table. The main result of these experiments62
is that people do not give the material conditional truth table. They judge63
that if A then C is true when A & C holds and false when A & not-C holds,64
but that not-A & C and not-A & not-C are irrelevant to the truth value of65
if A then C, and that if A then C is neither true nor false when either of66
these not-A rows hold (see [61]).67
68
1We will restrict ourselves to three values in this paper and so not divide uncertainty
into degrees of uncertainty or subjective probability here.
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The Equation and the defective truth table are fundamental to the seman-69
tics of what has been called the conditional event ([21]) and the probability70
conditional ([1]), and we will use these terms equivalently in this paper2.71
There are philosophical and logical reasons ([31]), and empirical grounds72
([36, 54, 55, 60]), for concluding that the indicative conditional of natural73
language is a probability conditional. [61] give theoretical reasons (going74
back to de Finetti [21, 22] and Ramsey [63]) and experimental support for75
closely comparing the natural language indicative conditional as a proba-76
bility conditional with a conditional bet in natural language. A bet on the77
natural language conditional, of the form We bet that if A then C, has three78
values. It is won when A & C holds, lost when A & not-C holds, and void79
or called off in not-A cases, and the probability of winning it, and the fair80
betting odds for it, is given by P (C | A). In [61], approximately 80% of81
participants answer that the bet is called off when the antecedent is false82
(see also [26], p. 166, note 9 for similar results).83
84
From this point of view, to assert an indicative conditional is to perform85
a conditional speech act, a conditional assertion, which is like other condi-86
tional speech acts, a conditional bet or, for another example, a conditional87
promise, We promise that if A then C. These speech acts are void when88
not-A holds, in the sense that there is then no assertion, no bet, and no89
promise.90
91
There is, however, another way to look at the third value in a three-valued92
table that is well represented in logical and philosophical research on the93
conditional event and probability conditional, but not so far in psychology.94
In this view, the third value is seen as uncertainty (noted from now on ‘U ’).95
A state of uncertainty can of course easily arise for the categorical compo-96
nents, A and C, of an indicative conditional and a conditional bet. We can97
be uncertain whether A or whether C holds, and the result is that the truth98
table for both conditionals expands from a 2× 2 table to a 3× 3 table. Con-99
sider the example (similar to one in the [59] experiments):100
101
If the USA economy grows this year (USA), then the French economy will102
also grow (FRA).103
104
2However, [51] points out that logical validity can be defined in terms of probability,
as suggested by the Equation ([31, 1]), or directly in terms of preserving values in de
Finetti or other tables, and that these two types of definition validate different patterns
of conditional inference.
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We might have enough economic data on both countries to know that USA105
and FRA are true or false, but we might also be waiting for data on either106
country or both, keeping us uncertain about USA or FRA or both. Taking107
the third value as uncertainty in this way, we can also have extended tables108
for negation, not-USA, conjunction, USA & FRA, disjunction, USA or FRA,109
and the material conditional, not-(USA & not-FRA). One object of our ex-110
perimental research has been to run the first psychological experiments in111
which there is uncertainty about the components of natural language in-112
dicative conditionals and bets on these, and on negations, conjunctions,113
disjunctions, and the material conditional. These experiments can give us114
evidence on how people classify these statement forms when they are uncer-115
tain and give further support to the project of explaining reasoning under116
uncertainty.117
1. The defective table is not defective in the new paradigm118
Wason [71] was the first psychologist to give truth table tasks about indica-119
tive conditionals to ordinary people and to discover that their judgements120
had three values (true T , false F , and irrelevant I ).121
C




Table 1. Participants’ truth table built for if A then C (with I for irrelevant)
In [71], Wason did not use the term defective for the resulting Table 1. [46]122
were apparently the first psychologists to use defective for the table 1, and123
after their article, the rather negative term defective came to be used more124
and more. Until very recently, the implication of most psychological research125
on the defective table was that people were somehow defective in failing to126
conform to a binary classification. There was no awareness shown in the127
psychological literature, until the recent development of the new paradigm128
([3, 61]), that an identical table had been proposed by several philosophers129
in their analysis of if in ordinary language with different interpretations of130
the third value. Quine [62] (referring to Rhinelander) gives a table with a131
value like irrelevance for a conditional with a false antecedent. O’Connor132
[57] defines a table analogous to Table 1 with a third undetermined value.133
Dummet [29] presents a table similar to Table 1 where the third value cor-134
responds to neither true nor false (see also [45]). Kneale and Kneale [47],135
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suggest Table 1 where the value I characterizes a gap value3.136
137
Following this point of view, I is considered as a third value that reflects a138
state of uncertainty, U . We argue that participants’ answers in truth-table139
tasks yield a coherent table for the conditional under uncertainty, and there140
is no supposedly defective table signifying a failure to understand the condi-141
tional. This position is central to the new paradigm, but should be followed142
by a full formal model of this coherent table with uncertainty. We must143
specify the complete conditional truth table(s) and more generally define144
the associated three-valued logic system(s).145
146
We designed novel experimental materials to allow us to establish partic-147
ipants’ truth-tables for a conditional in which the antecedent and the con-148
sequent could be true, false, or uncertain. As noted by Jeffrey [45], a table149
similar to Table 1 does not fully characterise a three-valued truth-table for150
the conditional if A then C, noted from now, following de Finetti’s conven-151
tion ([21]), as C | A. The U value in the body of Table 1, in the cases where152
the antecedent is false, refers to a third value that must also be present in153
the margins, as the antecedent or consequent can also be uncertain. Hence154
Table 1 should be extended to a table with the following Table 2 format.155
C
C | A T U F
A
T T ? F
U ? ? ?
F U ? U
Table 2. The coherent truth-value table format for the conditional (with U for uncertain)
We presented participants in our experiment with a logically compound sen-156
tence about a random chip, such as the natural language conditional if the157
chip is square then it is black. The chips referred to could be in two colours,158
black or white, and two shapes, square or round. In one scenario, the task159
was to judge whether if S then B was true, false, or neither. In the other160
scenario, the task was to judge whether bet on if S then B was won, lost,161
or neither. In both scenarios, there were two conditions of visibility (rep-162
resented on a computer). One, the chip was seen through a transparent163
3In this gap interpretation, [47, p. 128] use also the term defective in a different sense
than psychologists do: defective for defective truth function. In a similar gap interpretation
Holdcroft uses the term defective table for Table 1 (see [44, p. 124]).
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window, making S clearly true when the chip was square or clearly false164
when S was round, and similarly for B and black or white. Two, the chip165
was seen through a filtering window making it visually uncertain whether166
the chip was square or round, or whether it was black or white. This tech-167
nique allowed us to fill up the nine cells of a three-valued truth-table with168
the participants’ responses. The same materials were used for logical com-169
pounds of the other connectives: negation not-S, conjunction S & B, and170
disjunction S or B. And there was finally a material conditional expressed171
in the form not-(S & not-B).172
173
Another aspect of our work consisted of a comprehensive review of the174
logical, linguistic, philosophical, and AI literatures on three-valued logics.175
Probability theorists, particularly de Finetti [22], and other logicians and176
philosophers have given normative reasons for adopting three-valued sys-177
tems that include a conditional table with the Table 2 format ([50]). After178
this review, we could compare our experimental results with the reviewed179
systems. Before we describe our results, we will summarize our review of180
the relevant three-valued tables in the normative literature.181
2. Possible three-valued tables for the psychology of the in-182
dicative conditional183
Consider the range of possibilities for completing Table 2. The basic question184
is what should be in the place of each ‘?’ in Table 2: T , U , or F? There185
are, in theory, 243 possible tables (35). The same question arises for other186
connectives - negation, conjunction disjunction, and the material conditional187
- that can also be given general three-valued tables. Fortunately, we do188
not start from a tabula rasa. Among numerous possible three-valued logics189
([19, 41, 67]), the formal literature contains nine three-valued logic systems190
that are an extension of Table 1 for the conditional but also extend the191
bi-valued logic for all other connectives. This is the connective that de192
Finetti [21] called the conditional event and symbolized as C | A.4 Such a193
conditional has the fundamental property (I):194
C | A = C ∧A | A (I)
4Any event C can be written in a conditional form C | T , where T is a tautology. Thus
any three-valued connective table presented herein can be seen as a connective compounded
with a conditional.
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Three different extended conditional tables, which we call de Finetti, Farrell195
and Cooper conditional tables5, can be distinguished. These three tables196
can be used to categorise the nine systems.197
2.1. Nine three-valued systems198
All nine systems have involutive negation (¬). The conjunctive and disjunc-199
tive connectives are of four types: (i) Kleene- Lukasiewicz-Heiting (noted ∧K200
and ∨K , (ii) Sobocin´sky (noted ∧S and ∨S), (iii) Bochvar (internal) (noted201
∧B and ∨B) and (iv) McCarthy connectives (noted ∧M and ∨M ). The sys-202
tems explicitly incorporate a material conditional connective and thus also203
a material bi-conditional6. Six kinds of material conditional are proposed:204
(i) Kleene (⊃K), (ii)  Lukasiewicz, (⊃L), (iii) Sobocin´sky (⊃S), (iv and v)205
Bochvar (internal and external) (⊃B) and (⊃Be) and (vi) McCarthy (⊃M ).206
A further selection of three-valued logic systems can be made taking into207
account the main properties we can reasonably expect the connectives to208
have.209
2.1.1. The extended de Finetti conditional event table210
De Finetti ’s conditional table (see [21]) has been proposed and discussed by211
several authors. However, they have not always considered a comprehensive212
three-valued logic system with basic connectives (see for example [32, 52]).213
Strangely enough these authors failed to attribute the table to de Finetti,214
and they actually rediscovered the table with different interpretations of the215
U value, depending on their research field. We consider seven three-valued216
5We call the tables using the name of the author who first proposed them. The Farrell
and Cooper conditional tables are found in the lA literature and are often called Goodman
and Calabrese conditional tables. Jeffrey in [45] proposes 16 possible conditional tables
that respect some of Jeffrey’s chosen properties. Among them, there are the Farrell and
Cooper tables. However, if Jeffrey has an intuitionist negation, he does not specify the
conjunctive, disjunctive and implication connectives. Consequently we have not considered
Jeffrey’s tables in our review.
6The fact that a system includes both the conditional event and the material conditional
in a three-valued system is consistent with psychological results. Recent experiments of
natural language conditionals support the new paradigm in showing that participants
respond with a conditional event table. However, there is a minority of participants whose
responses are consistent with the material conditional table. This raises the possibility
that people can have two conditional interpretations: (i) The natural default interpretation
would be the conditional event and (ii) a more specific/elaborated interpretation could be
triggered by a particular context, e.g. definitional, logico-mathematic, and would consist
in a material conditional interpretation.
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C
C |F A T U F
A
T T U F
U U U U
F U U U
Table 3. The extended de Finetti conditional event table C |F A
logic systems in this category7.217
Fi system. This system includes the conjunction ∧K and disjunction ∨K218
as well as material conditional (⊃K)8. It has been expounded in at least219
five different ways9.220
i De Finetti defined Fi as a logic of probability that is a superimposed221
logic on a two-valued system (see [21, 23, 24, 25]). The third value222
represents doubt or uncertainty in an individual who is wondering223
whether a proposition is true or false. An event is always true or224
false, but there is a third case when the individual lacks the relevant225
knowledge and is uncertain. It is a ‘transitory’ subjective state of226
the individual, and the three-valued classification can become two-227
valued as knowledge increases. In this way, U is interpreted as a kind228
of ‘transitory’ value and not a third non-subjective value of the same229
type as truth or falsity10;230
ii Hailperin (see [42, 43]) introduces Fi as the logic that supports con-231
ditional probability logic. C |F A is illustrated with a suppositional232
interpretation: If A then C interpreted as C, supposing A or suppos-233
ing A, then C . The value U represents the undetermined, unknown234
7We regroup in the ‘same system the systems that propose the same set of connectives.
The truth tables for the connectives are displayed in the Appendix A (see Tables 7 to 10).
8The bi-conditional connective ⇔K is not often explicit
9Recently [68] endorses the same Fi system quoting de Finetti.
10The conditional event table is illustrated by a conditional bet interpretation: If A then
C interpreted as a bet that if A then C. Thus if A and C are true the bet is won, if A is
true and C is false the bet is lost and if A is false or A or C are unknown the bet is called
off. Such a void or null bet could be seen as having a kind of extreme uncertainty. In de
Finetti’s system, there are two additional connectives that allow to return to the bi-valued
logic: a Thesis connective T (A) which means ‘A is true’, and a Hypothesis connective
H(A) which means ‘A is not null’, X = C |F A; T (X) = C ∧ A and X = T (X) |F H(X)
(see in the Appendix A, the Table 6).
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or of no interest value;11235
iii Blamey (see [12]) proposes Fi, as a simple partial logic, where the236
third value U is interpreted as a truth-value gap that is considered237
as the minimal value (whereas the two truth-values true and false238
cannot be compared to each other). In this system C |F A is called239
the transplication12;240
iv In the linguistic field, Beaver formalize an identical Fi system ([7,241
8, 9]). C |F A is used as an ‘elementary presupposition operator’,242
defined with a ‘unary operator’ ∂13.243
v Rescher (see [66, 67]) discusses a quasi-truth functional system that244
is exactly Fi but where U is defined as an undetermined value (the245
bracketed entry (T , F ) that can be either T or F depending on the246
circumstances).247
R system. The second system is called R for Reichebach’s quantum system248
([64, 65]). It includes as Fi the conjunction ∧K and disjunction ∨K but249
uses two material conditionals: ⊃L and ⊃Be14. C |F A is called quasi-250
implication and can be represented as the observation of an experiment251
that is true if observation A has given the result C, false if observation252
A has given the result not − C and is meaningless or indeterminate if253
the observation A has not been made. It is very close to de Finetti’s254
conditional bet interpretation (see for a discussion the Appendix of [23]).255
BG system. This third system developed by the mathematicians Bruno and256
Gilio ([13]), shares de Finetti’s bet interpretation of the conditional. The257
disjunction table corresponds to ∨S and the conjunction to ∧B.258
BF system. The fourth system has been introduced in the field of logic (the259
logic of assertion for Belnap [10], and of presupposition for Farrell [37]).260
In BF system, the conjunction and the disjunction correspond to ∧S and261
∨S .262
11Hailperin introduces a connective 4 which means don’t care and can be used to define
C |F A thus C |F A = 4(¬A∨(A∧C)) = max{minA,C},min{1−A,U} with F < U < T .
12In his system, Blamey uses in addition an interjunction connective (noted ××) defined
by A××C = (A∧K U)∨K (A∧K C)∨K (U ∧K C) = (A∨K U)∧K (A∨K C)∧K (U ∨K C).
The conditional can be defined in relation with the interjunction C |F A = [A ∧K C] ×
× [A ⊃K C] (see Table 6).
13C |F A = (∂(A) ∧K C) ∨K (∂(A) ∨K ∂(¬A)) (see Table 6).
14Rechenbach calls ⊃Be alternative material condition. He adds to the involutive nega-
tion (called by Rechenbach diametrical negation), two other negations (Cyclical ∼ A and
Complete A¯).
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Mc system The Mc system supported by McDermot ([49]) groups Fi and263
BF systems (there are two conjunctions ∧K and ∧S and two disjunctions264
∨K and ∨S together with de Finetti’s conditional bet interpretation.265
MBV system. The seventh system proposed by Muskens, Van Benthem and266
Visset ([53]) in the linguistics field takes the conjunction ∧M and the267
disjunction ∨M .268
2.1.2. The extended Farrell conditional event table269
In the literature, there is one three-valued logic system that includes the270
Farrell conditional table.271
C
C |Fa A T U F
A
T T U F
U U U F
F U U U
Table 4. The extended Farrell conditional event table C |Fa A
GNW system. In a logical approach, with U standing for inappropriate, Far-272
rell in [38] proposes C |Fa A and ∧K and ∨K for conjunction and disjunc-273
tion15 . This system, called from now on GNW16, has been independently274
proposed by Goodman and colleagues in an algebraic approach where275
C |Fa A corresponds to a coset that can also be represented by an inter-276
val [A ∧ C,¬C ∨A] (see for example [40]).277
2.1.3. The extended Cooper conditional event table278
Two three-valued logic systems include the Cooper conditional table.279
SAC system. SAC system17 was initially proposed independently by Cooper280
([20]) and Belnap ([11]) in the field of logico-linguistics and logic, respec-281
15Farrell (1979) introduces also a bi-conditional-equivalence operator based on the con-
ditional table (see also section 2.2.3).
16In the AI literature, this system is called GNW for Goodman, Nguyen and Walker (see
for example[18]). For parsimony we adopted also GNW.
17In the AI literature, this system is called SAC for Schay, Adams and Calabrese. Adams
and Schay are associated to this system because both authors independently introduced
the connectors quasi conjunction and quasi disjunction that are actually the Sobocin´sky
connectives. However these authors have never (to our knowledge) given explicitly the
Cooper conditional table (with the 9 cells) or an iterated rule of conditional that allows to
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C
C |C A T U F
A
T T U F
U T U F
F U U U
Table 5. The extended Cooper conditional event table C |C A
tively (see also [30]). The conditional is defined as conditional assertion,282
and the third value U means unassertive. ∧S and ∨S define the system.283
Independently, Calabrese in numerous papers (see for example [14, 15]284
adopts an algebraic approach to the conditional and defines an identical285
system where the third truth-value U is used for an inapplicable condi-286
tional.287
Ca system. Cantwell defines a second system, Ca from now on, that sup-288
ports C |C A with ∧K and ∨K as conjunction and disjunction (see289
[17, 16]. The third value is interpreted here as a gap value.290
2.2. Three valued-logic systems and three basic constraints291
2.2.1. The Bayesian conditioning constraint on the conjunctive292
connective293
Some intuitive constraints on the conjunctive connective & have been for-294
mulated by [28]: The conjunction connective must respect the five following295
constraints: (i) it extends the bi-valued conjunction of propositional logic ∧,296
(ii) the conjunction of two uncertain conditionals must be uncertain, (iii) it297
is commutative and (iv) the conjunction between uncertain and true must298
be either true or uncertain and (v) it must follow Bayesian conditioning:299
P (C ∧A) = P (C | A)P (A) (II)
Calling t(A) a usual truth-assignment function, [28] show that the logical300
version of (II) is301
t(C | A& A | T ) = t(C ∧A | T ) (III)
construct the Cooper conditional table. Note also that Schay ([69]) proposes two additional
connectives for conjunction and disjunction that are the Bolchvar (internal) connectives.
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Now if A is false, C ∧ A is false then C | A is equal to U (for the three302
connectives tables):303
The conjunction of false and uncertainty must be false.304
Whereas the four types of conjunctive connectives related to our nine three-305
valued logic systems verify the first four constraints, two of them fail to meet306
the fifth constraint: The Bochvar (internal) conjunctive C∧B and McKarthy307
conjunctive C∧M do not respect this constraint. For these two connectives308
we have: F ∧BU = F ∧M U = U . The two three-valued logic systems BG and309
MBV that include Boschvar’s (internal) and McCarthy’s conjunctions can be310
removed from our scope.311
2.2.2. Basic constraint on the order of the truth-values312
A traditional interpretation of disjunctive and conjunctive connectives in313
the bi-valued logic is to assume an order on the two truth-values F < T .314
Thus the conjunction connective corresponds to a minimum and the disjunc-315
tion connective to a maximum. The  Lukasiewicz-Kleene (strong)-Heiting316
and Sobocin´sky conjunction and disjunction connectives can also be formu-317
lated as a minimum and a maximum. In this way the truth-value order for318
 Lukasiewicz-Kleene (strong)-Heiting connectives is F < U < T .319
320
In Sobocin´sky’s conjunctive connective, the order is F < T < U . How-321
ever if we interpret the Sobocin´sky disjunction as a maximum, the order322
must be modified: U < F < T . This absence of symmetry can be theoret-323
ically allowed (see [28]) but seems difficult to justify from a psychological324
point of view.325
2.2.3. Basic constraints on the equivalence connective326
As mentioned above, all the nine three-valued systems initially distinguished327
include a conditional event and a material conditional connective. Except328
for Farrell ([38]), no author has proposed a bi-conditional event based on the329
conditional event. However, from a psychological point of view, if people nat-330
urally interpret the natural language conditional following the conditional331
event table, they must also interpret the natural bi-conditional as the con-332
junction of two conditional events. Thus it seems also important to include333
this additional connective called from now on the equivalence connective334
(noted ||). From a Bayesian point of view, the probable equivalence between335
two events A and C is formulated by the following relation ([48]):336
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P (C || A) = P (C ∧A)
P (C ∨A) = P (C ∧A | C ∨A) (IV)
which is supported by experimental data (see for example [48, 70]). By337
analogy, we can expect that the equivalence connective verifies a similar338
relation:339
C || A = C | A ∧A | C = C ∧A | C ∨A (V)
Lets consider if this equality is respected for each equivalence connective in340
the seven left three-valued logic systems (see Appendix A)).341
• In the Fi and R systems the equivalence connective C ||F for (C |F342
A) ∧K (A |F C) based on the de Finetti |F conditional corresponds to343
(C ∧K A) |F (C ∨K A) (see Table 11)18.344
• The equivalence connective C ||Fa A built on the Farrell conditional345
C |Fa A ((C |Fa A) ∧K (A |Fa C)) for the GNW system is equal to (C ∧K346
A) |Fa (C ∨K A) (see Table 11).347
• Among the two systems that include the Cooper conditional, only the348
equivalence of Ca C ||Ca A is equal to (C ∧K A) |C (C ∨K A) (see Tables349
11 and 14)19.350
To summarize, only three three-valued logic systems respect the three con-351
straints on conjunction, order, and equivalence. They are the Fi, R , and352
GNW. The first two systems support de Finetti conditional event table and353
their difference lies only in the material conditional. Both systems have a354
very similar interpretation of the conditional event: the consequent C is355
the result of a dynamic process: a bet for de Finetti and an experiment356
for Reichenbach. GNW proposes the Farrell conditional table but shares all357
other connectives with de Finetti’s three-valued logic system. In GNW, the358
conditional is either an conditional assertion ([38]) or a mathematical object359
similar to an interval ([40]).360
18We can note that C ||F is also equal to the (C ∧B A) |F (C ∨S A) that is not equal to
C ||BG A (see Table 12). It is the same result with MBV system; (C ∧M A) |F (C ∨M A) is
equal to C ||F but no to C ||MBV (see Table 12). We can also note that C ||FB is equal to
C ||F but not to (C ∧S A) |F (C ∨S A) (see Table 13). Thus for Mc we only have equality
when it is reduced to a Fi system.
19It is also identical to C ||Fa A (see Table 11).
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3. The three-valued systems and the experimental results361
As noted in section 1, the participants in our experiment made judgements362
in two scenarios about logically compound statements: negation not-A, con-363
junction A & C, disjunction A or C, the natural language conditional if A364
then C, and the material conditional in the form not-(A & not-C). There365
was an assertion scenario, where participants were asked to judge whether366
a statement was true or false. And there was a bet scenario, where partic-367
ipants were asked to assess whether a bet was won or lost. A novel aspect368
of our experiment was that the component statements, A and C, could be369
uncertain as well as the compound statements. The statements referred to370
chips that had a round or square shape and a black or white colour. The371
type of uncertainty we studied was visual: a filter could block the sight of372
the shape or colour of a chip.373
374
Our main results can be briefly summarized ([4]). Our first main result375
was that the participants’ responses were parallel in the two scenarios - the376
assertion and the bet - for all connectives we reviewed. People treat ques-377
tions about the truth or falsity of assertions as similar to questions about378
winning or losing bets, and in particular, they treat natural language con-379
ditional assertions as similar to conditional bets. This result confirms, at380
a much more general level, the findings of [61]). The second main finding381
was that people agreed on their interpretation of negation, conjunction, and382
disjunction (see below), but were not unanimous on the natural language383
conditional, if S then B. For if S then B, the two main answers correspond384
to the conditional table 2 of section 1 (see Table 2 ) and to the conjunc-385
tion table. This finding confirms, again at a more general level, previous386
research showing that some people have a conjunctive interpretation of the387
conditional for the type of materials we used here. There is evidence that388
this interpretation is the result of processing limitations (see [3] for a discus-389
sion of this evidence).390
391
We have analysed the complete set of tables given by the participants’ re-392
sponses and have categorized these by how close they were to the tables we393
reviewed from the normative literature ([67]), which we summarized above394
in Section 2.1.20 The first significant outcome of this analysis is that most395
20The proximity corresponds to the number(s) of cell difference(s) with coherent tables
of the literature. For example if the conditional table has 0 difference with de Finetti’s
conditional table, it is classified ‘de Finetti’. If it has only one difference with de Finetti’s
conditional table and that this is the smaller ‘distance’ it is also classified in the de Finetti
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of the participants’ tables can be classified using the three-valued normative396
tables of Section 2.1. Their responses were not scattered over the 243 possi-397
bilities. Participants treated uncertainty coherently. In more detail, nearly398
all participants reproduced the involutive negation table. For the other con-399
nectives, the majority of responses coincided with the three-valued tables of400
the Fi logic system. These results for conjunction and disjunction confirm401
our expectations stated in section 2.2 on the connectives ∧K and ∨K . Recall402
that only the three systems (Fi, R and GNW) respect basic constraints. A403
second significant fact was the modal responses respected de Finetti’s condi-404
tional event table, not only for the conditional bet condition but also for the405
conditional assertion. Most participants did not treat the natural language406
conditional and the material conditional as similar to each other. These407
results add to the mounting evidence that ordinary people interpret the nat-408
ural language indicative conditional as very close to de Finetti’s conditional409
event.410
Conclusion411
For several decades psychologists have known that people judge that if A412
then B is true when A holds and C holds, false when A holds and C does413
not, and neither true nor false when A does not hold. For the last decade,414
there has been growing psychological evidence that people judge that the415
probability of the indicative conditional, P (if A then C ), is the conditional416
probability of C given A, P (C | A). More recently, psychologists have shown417
that there is a close relation between indicative conditionals and conditional418
bets. There is a great need to integrate these experimental findings in the419
new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning, with its Bayesian point of420
view. In our view, integration has been held back because psychologists421
did not even raise the general question of which three-valued tables people’s422
judgements correspond to under uncertainly. We have raised this general423
question and have systematically reviewed the relevant three-valued systems424
from the normative literature. We have also indicated how we investigated425
experimentally which normative tables provide the best descriptive fit for426
people’s judgements under uncertainty. We are not of course trying to make427
normative or logical judgements about which three-valued system should be428
preferred for some given interpretation of the third value. Our aim is to429
advance the new paradigm in the psychology of reasoning and its goal of a430
Bayesian account of ordinary reasoning. The result of our investigation is431
bucket.
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support for de Finetti’s three-valued tables in general, and his conditional432
event table in particular, as descriptive of people’s judgements under uncer-433
tainty.434
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A. Appendix: Three-valued truth tables435
A ¬A ∼ A A T (A) H(A) 4(A) ∂(A)
T F U U T T U T
U U F T F F U U
F T T T F T F U
Table 6. The truth tables for the involutive negation, (¬A), Reichenbach ‘cyclic negation’
(∼ A), Reichembach’s ‘complete’ negation (A), the unary de Finetti’s Thesis connective
(T (A)), de Finetti’s hypothesis connective (H(A)), Hailperin’s unary connective ‘don’t
care’ (4(A)), Blamey’s unary ‘presuposition operator’ (∂(A)).
A C A ∨K C A ∧K C A ⊃K C A⇔K C A ⊃L C A⇔L C
T T T T T T T T
T U T U U U U U
T F T F F F F F
U T T U T U T U
U U U U U U T T
U F U F U U U U
F T T F T F T F
F U U F T U T U
F F F F T T T T
Table 7.  Lukasiewicz-Heyting-Kleene’s truth tables for disjunction (∨K) and conjunction
(∧K), Keene’s truth table for implication (⊃K), Kleene-Bochvar-McCarthy’s truth table
for bi-conditional (⇔K),  Lukasiewicz’s truth tables for implication (⊃L) and bi-conditional
(⇔L).
18 JEAN BARATGIN, GUY POLITZER AND DAVID OVER
A C A ∨B C A ∧B C A ⊃B C A ⊃Be C A⇔R C
T T T T T T T
T U U U U F F
T F T F F F F
U T U U U T F
U U U U U T T
U F U U U T F
F T T F T T F
F U U U U T F
F F F F T T T
Table 8. Bochvar’s truth tables for disjunction (∨B), conjunction (∧B), implication (⊃B),
Bochvar-Reichenbach’s truth tables for ‘alternative’ implication (⊃Be) and bi-implication
(⇔R).
A C A ∨S C A ∧S C A ⊃S C A⇔S C
T T T T T T
T U T T F F
T F T F F F
U T T T T F
U U U U U U
U F F F F F
F T T F T F
F U F F T F
F F F F T T
Table 9. Sobocin´ski’s truth tables for disjunction (∨S), conjunction (∧S), implication (⊃S)
and bi-conditional (⇔S).
A C A ∨M C A ∧M C A ⊃M C
T T T T T
T U T U U
T F T F F
U T U U U
U U U U U
U F U U U
F T T F T
F U U F T
F F F F T
Table 10. McCarthy’s truth tables for disjunction (∨M ), conjunction (∧M ) and implication
(⊃M ).
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A C A ||F C A ||Fa C
= (A |F C) ∧K (C |F A) = (A |Fa C) ∧K (C |Fa A)
= (C ∧K A) |F (C ∨K A) = (C ∧K A) |Fa (C ∨K A)
= A ||Ca C
= (A |C C) ∧K (C |C A)
= (C ∧K A) |C (C ∨K A)
T T T T
T U U U
T F F F
U T U U
U U U U
U F U F
F T F F
F U U F
F F U U
Table 11. Equivalence truth tables for Fi system and R system (||F ) for GNW system (||Fa)
and for Ca system (||Ca).
A C A ||BG C (C ∧B A) |F (C ∨S A)
= (A |F C) ∧B (C |F A) = A ||F C
= A ||MBV C = (C ∧M A) |F (C ∨M A)
= (A |F C) ∧M (C |F A)
T T T T
T U U U
T F U F
U T U U
U U U U
U F U U
F T U F
F U U U
F F U U
Table 12. Equivalence truth tables for BG system (||BG) and MBV system (||MBV ). ||BG is
not equal to (C ∧M A) |F (C ∨M A) and ||MBV is not equal to (C ∧B A) |F (C ∨S A).
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A C A ||BF C (C ∧S A) |F (C ∨S A)
= (A |F C) ∧S (C |F A)
= A ||F C
T T T T
T U U T
T F F F
U T U T
U U U U
U F U U
F T F F
F U U U
F F U U
Table 13. Equivalence truth tables for BF system (||BF ). It is not equal to
(C ∧S A) |F (C ∨S A).
A C A ||SAC C (C ∧S A) |C (C ∨S A)
= (A |C C) ∧S (C |C A) = (C ∧S A) |F (C ∨S A)
T T T T
T U T T
T F F F
U T T T
U U U U
U F F U
F T F F
F U F U
F F U U
Table 14. Equivalence for SAC system is not equal to (C ∧S A) |C (C ∨S A) .
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